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A QUEST FOR LAW IN A LAWLESS SUPREME
COURT
Lino A. Graglia*
RICHARD FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT (HARVARD
UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018). PP. 240. HARDCOVER $41.00.

7KHSXUSRVHRI3URIHVVRU)DOORQ¶VERRNLVWRVKRZWKDWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWLVERXQG
by law despite its expansive policymaking role. As he VWDWHVLQWKHERRN¶V3UHIDFH³[W]e
QHHG WR UHFRJQL]H WKDW SROLWLFDO YLHZV ZLOO KDYH DQ LQHVFDSDEOH UROH´ LQ WKH &RXUW¶V
constitutional decisions. 1 The task, therefore, is to
develop conceptions of law in the Supreme Court, and legitimacy in judicial decision-making
that accommodate this realization. . . . But our conceptions of law and legitimacy in the
Supreme Court cannot be so flaccid that they would permit the Justices, with five votes, to
do anything they might be able to get away with. 2

42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 32 Side A

7RVD\DVKHGRHVWKDWKLVERRNLV³DPELWLRXV´3 is an understatement, as it attempts to do,
in an impressive display of lawyerly skill, what cannot be done: deny that the Supreme
Court is a lawless political institution.
The source of the problem Professor Fallon faces begins with the even more
fundamental problem that contemporary constitutional law is a matter of delusion and
pretense. The pretense is that the very old and very brief Constitution, written by a small
group of men in an incomparably different environment, provides meaningful answers to
FRQWHPSRUDU\VRFLDOSUREOHPV7KHUHVXOWLVWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VUXOLQJVRIXQFRQVWLWXWionality
DUHQHFHVVDULO\SROLF\MXGJPHQWV&RQVWLWXWLRQDOODZLVWKHSURGXFWRI³MXGLFLDOUHYLHZ´
the power of courts²largely invented by the courts²to invalidate policy choices made
by legislators and other officials of government on the ground that they are prohibited by
the Constitution.4 It happens, however, that the Constitution prohibits very few policy
choices and even fewer that American legislators might otherwise seek to adopt. The result
is that if judicial review was in practice what it is in theory, it would be a matter of very
limited importance, giving the Supreme Court a very limited policymaking role.
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A. W. Walker Centennial Chair Emeritus in Law.
1. RICHARD FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT xii (2018).
2. Id.
3. Id. at ix.
4. Id. at 1.
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The Constitution was adopted in 1789 to establish a national government, primarily
for purposes of defense, finance, and commerce, not to create or protect individual rights.5
The only substantive right created was a prohibition of debtor-relief laws.6 The first Ten
Amendments, known as the Bill of Rights, and adopted two years later, meant to apply to
only the federal government, and primarily concerned with criminal procedure, adds two
more substantive rights. The Second Amendment added a qualified right of the people to
³EHDU$UPV´7 and the Fifth prohibits confiscation of property. 8 Nothing better illustrates
the limited role of the Constitution than the fact that, as a practical matter, it largely comes
down to a single constitutional provision, the second sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment.9 Most constitutional cases involve state, not federal, law and nearly all of
them purport to turn on one or two clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment: one prohibiting
WKHVWDWHVIURP³GHSULY>LQJ@DQ\SHUVRQRIOLIHOLEHUW\RUSURSHUW\ZLWKRXWGXHSURFHVVRI
ODZ´DQGWKHRWKHUIURP³GHQ\>LQJ@WRDQ\SHUVRQ . WKHHTXDOSURWHFWLRQRIWKHODZV´10
The CoXUW¶VH[SDQVLYHSROLF\PDNLQJUROHUHVWVWRDODUJHH[WHQWRQDNLQGRIMXGLFLDOcoup
d’état whereby the Court converted these clauses to grants of power to invalidate any
deprivation of liberty or any discrimination, i.e.DQ\ODZLWFRQVLGHUV³XQUHDVRQDEO>H@´11
After the application of either of these revised clauses to a case, the Constitution drops out
RIWKHSLFWXUHOHDYLQJWKH&RXUWZLWKDSXUHSROLF\MXGJPHQW3URIHVVRU)DOORQ¶VWDVNOLNH
WKDWRIDOOQRQRULJLQDOLVWSURSRQHQWVRIWKH³OLYLQJ&RQVWLWXWLRQ´12 is to deny or obscure
WKLVUHDOLW\DQGJLYHWKH&RXUW¶VUXOLQJRIXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\³OHJLWLPDF\´ 13 by showing
that the Justices are in some way limited by the Constitution.
3URIHVVRU )DOORQ¶V ERRN FDQ EH VHHQ DV D UHVSRQVH WR D ZHOO-known statement by
-XVWLFH:LOOLDP-%UHQQDQWKDW)DOORQTXRWHVLQKLVSUHIDFH³:LWKILYHYRWHV\RXFDQGR
DQ\WKLQJ´14 ³%UHQQDQZDVZURQJ´)DOORQVD\VDV³WKHUHDUHVRPHWKLQJV²indeed, many
things²WKDWWKH-XVWLFHVFDQQRWGRHYHQZLWKILYHYRWHV´ 15 Later in the book, he quotes
the also well-known statement of Charles Evans Hughes, later a Chief Justice of the United
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5. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (³[B]ills of rights
are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects . . . . [T]hey have no application to constitutions,
professedly founded upon the power of the people and executed by their immediate representatives and
servants.´).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (³No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.´).
The history of the provisions demonstrates why constitutional restrictions on policy choices should not be
favored. Human life and society are too various to admit of absolute principles. See Home Building & Loan
Ass¶n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (finding it necessary to virtually read this section out of the Constitution
to allow Minnesota to provide some relief to indebted farmers during the Great Depression).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. II (³A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.´).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V (³[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.´).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (³No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.´).
10. Id.
11. See Lino A. Graglia, Creative Constitutional Interpretation as Justification for Rule by the Supreme
Court, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 109, 116±17 (2019).
12. Id. at 110.
13. FALLON, supra note 1, at x.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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16. Id. at 105.
17. Id.
18. FALLON, supra note 1, at 105.
19. Id. at 107.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 108.
23. FALLON, supra note 1, at 109.
24. Id. at 110.
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
26. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds.,
15th ed. 2004).
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6WDWHV6XSUHPH&RXUWWRWKHVDPHHIIHFW³WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQLVZKDWWKHMXGJHVVD\LWLV´ 16
7KLVZRXOGEHWUXH)DOORQDGPLWV³>L@IWKHUHLVQRZD\WR enforce the Constitution against
WKH-XVWLFHVDQGLIWKH\DUHWKXVSUDFWLFDOO\XQFRQVWUDLQHG´17 The Justices are, however,
KH DUJXHV VXEMHFW WR SUDFWLFDO UHVWUDLQWV ERWK ³H[WHUQDO´ ³LPSRVHG E\ RWKHUV´ DQG
³QRUPDWLYH´³VWDQGDUGVWRZKLFKRIILFLDOVRXJKWWRFRQIRUP´18 They are constrained by
the Constitution itself, by for example, its separation of powers, which means that just as
the PUHVLGHQWFDQQRW³VHQWHQFHSHRSOHWRMDLOIRUKDYLQJFRPPLWWHGWD[IUDXG´WKH&RXUW
³FDQQRWVHWLQWHUHVWUDWHVRUHVWDEOLVKQDWLRQDOGHIHQVHSROLFLHV´19
³$VNLQJZKHWKHUWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQFRQVWUDLQV-XVWLFHVRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW´)DOORQ
DUJXHV³LVOLNHDVNLQJZKHWKHUWKHUXOHVRIEDVHEDOOFRQVWUDLQWKHXPSLUHIURPJLYLQJRQH
team four strikes per batter or four outs per iQQLQJ´20 'RLQJ WKDW ZRXOG EH WR ³VWHS>@
outside the role of an umpire in a baseball game as defined by broadly shared
XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIWKHUXOHVWKDWPDNHEDVHEDOOEDVHEDOO´21 Similarly, the Court could not,
IRUH[DPSOH³RUGHU>@WKHDUP\WRLQYDGH,UDQ´22 The rules of baseball, however, are clear,
specific, and enforceable; the rules of constitutional lawmaking by the Supreme Court, if
any, are uncertain and unsanctioned, and, unlike the umpire, the Court decides the case.
7KH&RXUW¶VFUHDWLRQRIDconstitutional right to have an abortion, for example, seems a
clear case of it successfully stepping out of the judicial role and into the legislative role,
HYHQLILWFDQ¶WRUGHUWKHLQYDVLRQRI,UDQ
Turning to external restraints, Professor Fallon points out that each Justice is
³FRQVWUDLQHGLQGLYLGXDOO\E\WKHQHHGWRVHFXUHWKHDJUHHPHQWRIDWOHDVWIRXUFROOHDJXHV
LQRUGHUWRUHQGHUOHJDOO\HIILFDFLRXVMXGJPHQWV´ 23 which seems more to affirm than to
GLVSXWH-XVWLFH%UHQQDQ¶VVWDWHPHQW$QRWKHUSRWHQWial external constraint, Fallon argues,
LVWKDWWKH³&RQVWLWXWLRQHPSRZHUV&RQJUHVVDQGWKHSUHVLGHQWWRLPSRVHVDQFWLRQVRQWKH
Supreme Court and its Justices if they deviate from what Congress and the president take
WREHWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶VGLFWDWHV´24 He does not, however, specify the source or the nature
of these sanctions or give any example of their being used. The only sanctions for judicial
misbehavior provided for in the Constitution are impeachment and removal from office
IRU³KLJK&ULPHVDQG0LVGHPHDQRUV´25 and abuse of judicial power is not considered a
crime. Only one Justice was ever impeached, and he was not convicted, causing President
-HIIHUVRQWRGHQRXQFHLPSHDFKPHQWDV³QRWHYHQDVFDUH-FURZ´26
A potentially significant constraint on the Court mentioned by Fallon is the power
RI&RQJUHVVWROLPLWE\VWDWXWHWKH&RXUW¶VDSSHOODWHMXULVGLFWLRQEXWIRUYDULRXVUHDVRQV
including that the Court gets to pass on the validity of the statute, it has rarely been used.
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FALLON, supra note 1, at 110.
Id. at 111.
Id.
Id. at 113.
Id.
FALLON, supra note 1, at 110.
Id. at 114±15.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 11; see generally Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929 (2014).
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Fallon finds it useful to mentLRQWKDWWKH -XVWLFHV ³DUH DOVRVXEMHFWWRWKH FULPLQDOODZ
LQFOXGLQJLWVSURKLELWLRQVDJDLQVWEULEHU\DQGH[WRUWLRQ´ 27 As another external constraint,
)DOORQQRWHVWKDW3UHVLGHQW)UDQNOLQ5RRVHYHOWSURSRVHG³SDFNLQJ´WKH&RXUWE\DGGLQJ
some friendly Justices, but the proposal was almost uniformly denounced as improper and
ZDVGHIHDWHGDIWHUD³VZLWFK´E\WKH&RXUWPDGHLWXQQHFHVVDU\ 28
³3HUKDSVWKHPRVWSUDFWLFDOO\LPSRUWDQWFRQVWUDLQWRQWKH-XVWLFHV´3URIHVVRU)DOORQ
VWDWHVLV³WKHSURVSHFWWKDWVRPH decisions they might imaginably render would be treated
DV QXOOLWLHV RU RWKHUZLVH SURYH LQHIILFDFLRXV´ 29 Fallon gives as examples the Marshall
&RXUW¶VUHIXVDOWRLQYDOLGDWHDVWDWXWHWKDWUHPRYHGVL[WHHQ)HGHUDOLVWMXGJHVDSSRLQWHGIRU
life, as the Constitution provides, from office by abolishing their offices, and its refusal to
LVVXH DQ RUGHU WR WKH -HIIHUVRQ DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ ZKHQ IDFHG ZLWK ³D FUHGLEOH WKUHDW RI
GHILDQFH´LQMarbury v. Madison.30 These decisions, Fallon is correct, might well have
been influenced by prudence given the weak and vulnerable position of the Court in its
earliest days, but that is not its position today. He mentions as further examples of
QXOOLILFDWLRQ3UHVLGHQW/LQFROQ¶VUHIXVDOGXULQJWKHHDUO\GD\VRIWKH&LYLO:DUWRREH\Dn
RUGHUE\&KLHI-XVWLFH7DQH\WRIUHHDQDOOHJHG&RQIHGHUDWHFROODERUDWRUDQGWKH&RXUW¶V
decision to allow military trials and summary executions of alleged Nazi saboteurs after
3UHVLGHQW 5RRVHYHOW ³PDGH LW NQRZQ´ WKDW KH ZRXOG QRW REH\ D FRQWUDU\ GHFLVion.31
Finally, he argues that the Court did not order immediate desegregation in Brown v. Board
of Education EHFDXVH ³LW NQHZ WKDW D PDQGDWH RI LPPHGLDWH GHVHJUHJDWLRQ PLJKW KDYH
SURYHGLQHIILFDFLRXV´32 Exercise of caution in a truly revolutionary decision would not be
surprising, but the Court was faced not only with possible defiance by southern school
districts but more importantly with the fact that the districts could and would effectively
and legally avoid desegregation by simply closing the public schools.
7XUQLQJWRWKHDOOHJHG³3ROLWLFDOO\&RQVWUXFWHG%RXQGVRI-XGLFLDO3RZHU´3URIHVVRU
Fallon argues that Congress permits the Court to have the last word on social policy issues
RQO\LILWVGHFLVLRQV³UHPDLQZLWKLQWKHERXQGVRISROLWLFDODQGSUDFWLFDOWROHUDELOLW\´33 It
LVQRGRXEWWUXHEXWDOPRVWWDXWRORJLFDOWKDW³GHFLVLRQVWKDWSURYRNHVXIILFLHQWO\EURDGDQG
HQGXULQJ SXEOLF RXWUDJH ZLOO QRW VXUYLYH´34 In place of examples of these supposed
constraints, Fallon resorts to the canard, favored by defenders of judicial power, that the
&RXUW ³KDV QHYHU VWUD\HG YHU\ IDUIRUYHU\ORQJ IURP PDLQVWUHDPSXEOLFRSLQLRQ´ 35 In
fact, there is little that Congress or the people can do about unwanted constitutional
decisions as is illustrated by the fact that none of the often-detested revolutionary decisions
of the Warren and Burger Courts have ever been overturned.
)LQDOO\ 3URIHVVRU )DOORQ DUJXHV WKDW WKH -XVWLFHV DUH VXEMHFW WR ³>Q@RUPDWLYH
FRQVWUDLQWV´7KH-XVWLFHVKHWKLQNV³XQGHUVWDQGWKHPVHOYHVDVVXEMHFW to legal obligations
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FALLON, supra note 1, at 120.
Id. at 121±22.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 23, 134.
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DV ZHOO DV SROLWLFDO FRQVWUDLQWV´ DQG WKH\ WDNH WKHP ³VHULRXVO\´ 36 He does not tell us,
KRZHYHUZKDWWKH\DUHRUKRZWKH\FRQVWUDLQ+HUHMHFWVWKHYLHZRI³QRUPVNHSWLFDO´
SROLWLFDOVFLHQWLVWVWKDWVXJJHVWWKH³-XVWLFHVFRQVLVWHQWO\ vote to decide cases in ways that
GLUHFWO\ UHIOHFW WKHLU LGHRORJLFDO YDOXHV´ EHFDXVH WKH VNHSWLcs wrongly assume that
ideology ³PXVW DOZD\V GRPLQDWH DOO RWKHU FRQVLGHUDWLRQV´37 The fact that the Justices
disagree on ideological grounds does not mean, he VD\VWKDWWKH\³GRQRWIHHOQRUPDWLYHO\
FRQVWUDLQHG E\ WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ DQG DSSOLFDEOH LQWHUSUHWLYH QRUPV´ 38 It does show,
however, that their decisions are ideologically based.
Professor Fallon next turns to the favorite topic of constitutional scholars, theories
RIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ$OWKRXJKWKH-XVWLFHVDUHKHDUJXHV³PHDQLQJIXOO\ERXQG
E\ODZ´WKH³UHOHYDQWOHJDODXWKRULWLHVDUHRIWHQLQGHWHUPLQDWH´SUHVHQWLQJWKH-XVWLFHV
ZLWK WKH SUREOHP RI KRZ WR ³VHWWOH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO LVVXHV FRUUHFWO\´39 As far as
constitutional law is concerned, however, the relevant legal authorities²the
Constitution²are very few, and mostly determinate. To the extent that they are
indeterminate²probably because the Court has made them so²they should not present
the Court with a constitutional problem. If a legislatively enacted policy choice is not
clearly prohibited by the Constitution, the only conclusion consistent with the theory of
judicial review is that it is not unconstitutional²³FOHDUO\´EHFDXVHLQDGHPRcracy, the
legislative choice should prevail in cases of doubt. Further, constitutional issues are almost
DOZD\V SROLF\ LVVXHV WKDW GR QRW KDYH D VLQJOH ³FRUUHFW´ DQVZHU $ SROLF\ LVVXH DULVHV
because interests recognized as legitimate come into conflict, which can be resolved only
by making a policy choice, a trade-off, not by empirical investigation or logical analysis.
Marches and street demonstrations, for example, may be valuable means of political
expressions, but it is also important that the streets can be sometimes used as streets. The
only question to be decided by a Supreme Court Justice faced with a challenge of a
regulation of street demonstrations is the extent to which he or she is willing to override
the legislative choice.
Constitutional interpretation should not be a mysterious subject. The Constitution
VKRXOGSUHVXPDEO\EHLQWHUSUHWHGOLNHDQ\RWKHUZULWWHQGRFXPHQWWRUHFHLYHWKHDXWKRU¶V
message assuming that it is written in a known language with words used in their
conventional sense. It has a fixed meaning dependent upon the intent of the author or, in
the case of the Constitution, the understanding of the ratifiers. This view is known in
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQWKHRU\DV³RULJLQDOLVP´7KHDOWHUQDWLYHQRQ-originalist, view
is thHWKHRU\RIWKH³OLYLQJ&RQVWLWXWLRQ´DFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKWKHPHDQLQJRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
SURYLVLRQVFDQDQG GRFKDQJHRYHU WLPH ³[L]LYLQJ &RQVWLWXWLRQ´ LV KRZHYHUVLPSO\ D
misleading metaphor; short of constitutional amendment, the words of the Constitution do
QRWFKDQJHLWLVRQO\WKH-XVWLFHVZKRDSSO\WKHPWKDWGRWKH³OLYLQJ´ 40 By giving the
words new meaning, they effectively rewrite the Constitution. The purpose and effect of
the metaphor is to make judicial performance of the legislative function appear to be
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FALLON, supra note 1, at 134.
Id. at 135.
Id.
Id. at 125±26.
Id. at 126.
FALLON, supra note 1, at 136.
Id. at 148.
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performance of the judicial function. Arguing that the Constitution need not necessarily
mean what it was intended or understood to mean presents living constitutionalists with
the problem of what, then, it does mean, of what is its alternative source of meaning. The
apparent conclusion that it can then mean anything the so-called interpreter wants it to
mean must be denied by proponents of the living Constitution because that would make
the Constitution even more obviously irrelevant.
Professor Fallon begins his discussion of theories of constitutional interpretation
ZLWKDVWDWHPHQWWKDWLVHVVHQWLDOO\WKHRULJLQDOLVWSRVLWLRQWKDW³FRXUWVVKRXOGLQYDOLGDWH
statutes only in cases of plain uQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\ UHIOHFWLQJ µa clear mistake,¶´ ZKLFK
³HPSKDVL]HV WKH OHJDO DQG PRUDO VLJQLILFDQFH RI GHFLVLRQ-making by democratically
DFFRXQWDEOH ODZPDNHUV´41 He rejects this position, however, in favor of a number of
living Constitution theories that he finds more acceptable. He endorses, for example,
3URIHVVRU'DYLG6WUDXVV¶WKHRU\WKDWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWVKRXOGGHFLGHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFDVHV
as a common law court, free to make changes in the law. The difficulty with this is, of
course, that common law, but not constitutional decisions, are legislatively revisable by
ordinary statute. Professor Strauss objects to originalism, incredibly, on the ground that it
³ZRXOGXQIDLUO\SULYLOHJHWKHYLHZVRISHRSOHZKROLYHGORQJDJRRYHUWKHMXGJPHQWVRI
WKRVH OLYLQJ WRGD\´42 which is true but is not an objection to originalism but to
constitutionalism. It is a good reason to disfavor adopting constitutional restrictions, but
not to create new ones or ignore the ones we have. Fallon also praises Professor Philip
%REELWW¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKH&RXUWGHFLGHFRQVWitutional cases on the basis of a number of
³PRGDOLWLHV´LQFOXGLQJWH[WXDOKLVWRULFDODQGVWUXFWXUDO:KHQWKHVHPRGDOLWLHVFRPHLQWR
FRQIOLFWDVWKH\VXUHO\PXVW%REELWWUHFRPPHQGVGHFLGLQJRQWKHEDVLVRI³FRQVFLHQFH´43
That these so-called alternative methods of interpretation are in practical effect
prescriptions for unconstrained judicial policymaking seems too clear for dispute.
3URSRQHQWV RI ³LQWHUSUHWLYH PHWKRGRORJLHV´ VKRXOG VHHN DQ DSSURDFK 3URIHVVRU
)DOORQ DUJXHV WKDW ³ZRXOG DGYDQFH HVWDEOLVK RU HQVXUH MXGLFLDO OHJLWLPDF\´44
³$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH VWDQGDUG PRGHO´ KH VWDWHV ³-XVWLFHV  . . would ideally adopt a
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO WKHRU\ EHIRUH DVFHQGLQJ WR WKH EHQFK´ DQG WKHQ ³DSSO\ WKDW WKHRU\
FRQVLVWHQWO\WRGHFLGHWKHFDVHV´ ZKLFK ZRXOG ³SUHFlude unprincipled, outcome-driven
adjudication in which the Justices experience no real methodological discipline and vote
for . . LGHRORJLFDOO\FRQJHQLDO´ UHVXOWV 45 Fallon rejects this approach, however, as too
rigid. He also rejects the view of some poOLWLFDO VFLHQWLVWV WKDW ³GHEXQN GHEDWHV DERXW
LQWHUSUHWLYHPHWKRGRORJ\DVDQDFDGHPLFSUHWHQVLRQ´RIQRSUDFWLFDOHIIHFWEXWKHILQGV
WKDW WKH ³OHDGLQJ´ WKHRULHV DOVR KDYH ³OLPLWDWLRQV´46 +H UHFRPPHQGV ³5HIOHFWLYH
(TXLOLEULXP 7KHRU\´47 as a better approach which he borrows from moral philosopher
John Rawls. Rawls argued that moral reasoning involves two-way traffic between our
provisional judgments about particular cases and our over-arching moral principles. The
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Id. at 147±48.
Id. at 154.
FALLON, supra note 1, at 157±58.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 165.
Id.
FALLON, supra note 1, at 165.
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Supreme Court, Fallon argues, should decide constitutional cases by similarly attempting
WR³EULQJRXUFDVH-specific judgments into alignment with our principles, and vice versa,
>LQ@ D TXHVW IRU µUHIOHFWLYH HTXLOLEULXP¶´ ZKLFK VKRXOG DLG -XVWLFHV LQ DFKLHYLQJ
³SULQFLSOHGFRQVLVWHQF\´LQFRQVWLWXWLonal decision-making.48 The widespread adoption of
WKLV WKHRU\ KH VD\V ³ZRXOG XQGRXEWHGO\ UHTXLUH VLJQLILFDQW UHYLVLRQV LQ RXU H[LVWLQJ
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO SUDFWLFH´ LQ WKDW LW OHDGV WR ZKDW KH FDOOV WKH ³VWDUWOLQJO\ FRXQWHULQWXLWLYH
FRQFOXVLRQ´ WKDW ³FRPPLWPHnts to interpretive methodologies are and ought to be
UHYLVDEOHWKRXJKVXEMHFWWRWKHGHPDQGVDQGGLVFLSOLQHRIJRRGIDLWK´ 49 This theory is
EHWWHUWKDQWKHRWKHUWKHRULHVKHDUJXHVEHFDXVHLW³FDSWXUHVWKHDSSURSULDWHUHODWLRQVKLS
between theory and case-by-case practice in the quest for moral and legal legitimacy in
FRQVWLWXWLRQDODGMXGLFDWLRQ´50
,Q KLV ILQDO FKDSWHU 3URIHVVRU )DOORQ FRQFOXGHV QRQH WRR FOHDUO\ WKDW ³WKH
conjunction of democracy in constitutional interpretation with sharp ideological division
in politics has produced, or at least threatens to generate, serious grounds for forwardlooking worry about the legitimacy of constitutional adjudication by the Supreme Court,
DWOHDVWLQWKHVRFLRORJLFDODQGXOWLPDWHO\LQWKHPRUDOVHQVH´51 In response to this worry,
)DOORQRIIHUVWZRVXJJHVWLRQV)LUVWXQGHUWKHKHDGLQJ ³7KH&DVH IRU*UHDWHUµ-XGLFLDO
5HVWUDLQW¶´ KH DUJXHV WKDW EHFDXVH ³&RQJUHVV DQG WKH VWDWH OHJLVODWXUHV KDYH FODLPV WR
moral and political legitimacy that arise from their demRFUDWLF DFFRXQWDELOLW\´ FRXUWV
VKRXOGEH³UHOXFWDQ>W@WRUHMHFWDVXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOOHJLVODWLRQWKDW&RQJUHVVRUWKHVWDWH
OHJLVODWXUHVKDYHSUHVXPDEO\DGMXGJHGWREHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\YDOLG´ 52 He believes that in
³DVXEVWDQWLDOIUDFWLRQRIWKHFDVHVLQZKLFKWKH-XVWLFHVLQYDOLGDWH>G@OHJLVODWLRQ´WKHLU
LQWHUYHQWLRQZDVXQZDUUDQWHGDQGWKDWWKH-XVWLFHVFRXOGDFKLHYH³DPRUHDSSURSULDWHO\
UHVWUDLQHG DSSURDFK´ E\ DGRSWLQJ KLV 5HIOHFWLYH (TXLOLEULXP 7KHRU\ RI FRQVWLWXWLRQDO
interpretation.53
Professor Fallon¶V VHFRQG VXJJHVWLRQ IRU OHVVHQLQJ WKH ZRUU\ DERXW WKH 6XSUHPH
&RXUW OHJLWLPDF\ LV WKH DGRSWLRQ RI ³&KDQJLQJ 1RUPV RI WKH -XGLFLDO 1RPLQDWLRQ DQG
&RQILUPDWLRQ´54 +HEHOLHYHVWKDWEHFDXVHWKH&RXUW³KDVFRPHWRSOD\DQLQFUHDVLQJO\
prominent and ideologicalO\LQIOHFWHGUROHLQRXUFRQVWLWXWLRQDOVFKHPH´WKHQRPLQDWLRQ
and confirmation of Justices have FRPH WR EH YLHZHG DV ³PDWWHUV RI KLJK SROLWLFDO DQG
VRPHWLPHV SDUWLVDQ FRQVHTXHQFH´ OHDGLQJ WR ³VFKHPLQJ SRVWXULQJ DQG
JDPHVPDQVKLS´55 +HUHFRPPHQGVWKDWSUHVLGHQWVDQGVHQDWRUV³DJUHHRQDQGDELGHE\
SULQFLSOHVRIPRGHUDWLRQ´GHILQHGDV³OHJDODQGSROLWLFDOFHQWULVP´ 56 While he claims to
UHMHFW WKH ³UXOH RI FOHDU PLVWDNH´ KH UHSHDWV WKDW WKH &RXUW VKRXOG QRW ³IUXVWUDWH WKH
operation of the political process by invalidating legislation adopted by institutions with
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3URIHVVRU)DOORQHQGVWKHERRNZLWKDVHFWLRQKHDGHG³$Q$SSUDLVDORIWKH0RUDO
/HJLWLPDF\RI6XSUHPH&RXUW'HFLVLRQ0DNLQJ´DQGFRQFOXGHVWKDW ³WKH -XVWLFHVH[HUW
PRUH DXWKRULW\ WR OLPLW GHPRFUDWLF GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ WKDQ WKH\ VKRXOG´ EHFDXVH RI WKHLU
³UHIXVDOWRJLYHJUHDWHUGHIHUHQFH´WRGHPRFUDWLFLQVWLWXWLRQV 58 He rejects the conclusion
RIWKH³&\QLFDO5HDOLVWV´LQFOXGLQJIRUPHU-XGJH5LFKDUG 3RVQHUWKDW³PHWKRGRORJLFDO
DUJXPHQWDWLRQLQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWLVPHUHO\DVKDP´59 SUHIHUULQJWRH[SODLQWKH&RXUW¶V
decision-PDNLQJRQWKHEDVLVRIWKH)DLQWKHDUWHG&RPPLWPHQWV+\SRWKHVLVZKLFK³KROGV
that the Justices generally apply consistent decision-making premises from one case to the
next, but that they tend to deviate when necessary to reach what they regard as morally
and practically desirable outcomes in high-VWDNHVFDVHV´60 %\³>H@VFKHZLQJWRRPDQ\WRR
ULJLGDGYDQFHFRPPLWPHQWV´WKH5HIOHFWLve Equilibrium Hypothesis allows the Justices
WRUHDFK³LGHRORJLFDOO\FRQJHQLDOUHVXOWVLQDVXEVWDQWLDOIUDFWLRQRIEXWQRWDOOFDVHV´ 61
This apparently would be enough to show that the Court is subject to some constraint and
therefore not a lawless political institution. Its adoption by the Justices, Fallon concludes,
³FRXOGGRDJUHDWGHDOWRHQKDQFHWKHPRUDOOHJLWLPDF\RIFRQVWLWXWLRQDODGMXGLFDWLRQLQ
WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW´62
,W LV GLIILFXOW WR LPDJLQH D ³PHWKRGRORJLFDO´ FRQFOXVLRQ OHVV OLNHO\ WR KDYH Dny
practical effect. The Cynical Realists are surely correct that methodology is much less
important in Supreme Court constitutional decision-making than Professor Fallon
assumes. His Reflective Equilibrium Theory is, virtually by definition, much too vague
DQGXQFHUWDLQWREHXVHIXO0RUHLPSRUWDQWWKHEDVLFSUREOHPZLWK)DOORQ¶VDSSURDFKDV
ZLWKDOOOLYLQJ&RQVWLWXWLRQWKHRULHVRI³LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´LVWKDWLWDVVXPHVFRQWUDU\WRWKH
theory of judicial review and without historical support or argument, that the Court ought
to invalidate as unconstitutional policy choices made in the ordinary political process on
moral as well as legal grounds, effectively rewriting the Constitution by adding
prohibitions of disfavored policies. The only way that the Court can enhance the
legitimacy, moral or otherwise, of its constitutional adjudication is by confining itself to
invalidating as unconstitutional only those legislative policy choices that the Constitution
actually prohibits.

Id. at 160, 165.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 169, 171.
Id. at 170.
FALLON, supra note 1, at 170.
Id. at 174.
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